UNITED NATIONS

General Assembly

FORTY-FIFTH SESSION

Official Records

FIRST COMMITTEE
5th meeting
held on
Tuesday, 16 October 1990
at 3 p.m.
New York

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 5th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. RANA (Nepal)

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Distr. GENERAL
A/C.1/45/PV.5
23 October 1990
ENGLISH

90-63034 2289V (E)

best copy available

The meeting was called to order at 3.30 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 45 to 66 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT ITEMS

Mr. O'BRIEN (New Zealand): Congratulations to you, Mr. Chairman, and to the other officers of the Committee. Your country, Nepal, is the headquarters of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament and that Centre plays a very important part in developing thinking and discussion about disarmament issues for the Asia-Pacific region, a region which my country shares with yours.

The year 1990 represents a time of challenge for the United Nations security system. Recent events in the Persian Gulf region emphatically prove, more than anything else, that an end to the cold war does not automatically lead to the consolidation of global security. They highlight the enduring problems of regional security and vividly demonstrate the significant threats that remain to the security of small States in our community of nations.

The end of the cold war should mean a more secure world, but, as the Secretary-General notes in his annual report, a comprehensive approach to security is axiomatic if the unfolding opportunities are now to be seized. Addressing the multifaceted aspects of security is, we think, the challenge of today.

The South Pacific region is distant from the centres of world tension and present regional conflict. But New Zealand is keenly conscious that it is not immune from the strains of global political, economic and environmental change. Indeed, these often impact disproportionately on the fragile political, economic and physical settings of our region.

(Mr. O'Brien, New Zealand)

As a consequence, New Zealand is committed to addressing its security needs through a balanced and integrative approach within a regional framework of co-operation with our South Pacific neighbours. This regional approach to security was the focus for the Pacific Security Symposium hosted by New Zealand earlier this year, which aimed at promoting this integral view of disarmament, economic and environmental issues in our region.

The co-operative resolve of South Pacific nations is enhanced by recognition that the major challenges to the security of our region emanate from outside, whether the issue is ozone depletion or global warming caused by activities in the industrialized North, driftnet fishing carried out by distant water fishing nations, the disposal of chemical weapons from Europe, or the continued testing of nuclear weapons in a region that is committed unswervingly to non-nuclear principles.

Nuclear testing in the South Pacific by France outside its metropolitan territory is an unacceptable intrusion into our region. For decades New Zealand and other South Pacific countries have protested against the nuclear testing programme at Mururoa and Fangataufa. Our protests have gone unheeded.

New Zealand takes a clear stand against all nuclear testing. What makes nuclear tests in the South Pacific all the more objectionable is that they are being conducted against the wishes of the people of the region. It is a fundamental point of principle for us that our region, which has declared itself nuclear free, should not be used by an outside Power for nuclear weapons development. The assurances we are offered about the safety of these tests do not address this point. Nor have they been sufficient to allay the fears about the potential threat to the fragile South Pacific environment.

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(Mr. O'Brien, New Zealand)

The South Pacific nuclear-free zone underlines the rejection of nuclear weapons by our region. Fifteen years ago the General Assembly endorsed the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific. Five years ago the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty was adopted by South Pacific States as the Treaty of Rarotonga. Last year the Treaty was overwhelmingly endorsed by the membership of the United Nations. Two permanent members of the Security Council have given their formal commitment to this initiative by signing the relevant protocols to the Treaty. Two others have given assurances that their actions are not inconsistent with the Treaty's provisions. However, the New Zealand Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control, in her recent address to the General Assembly, urged all the nuclear-weapon States to make a formal commitment by signing the protocols to the Treaty. Such actions would, in our view, constitute the very logic of the new world order that is emerging.

The Treaty of Rarotonga is the most concrete manifestation of the South Pacific co-operative approach to security. It complements the nuclear-free policies which New Zealand itself enacted domestically in 1987 in the New Zealand Nuclear-Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act. Furthermore, it explicitly reinforces the principles that underpin the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It reinforces the view that no country - no matter how far it may be situated from the potential theatre of nuclear conflict - can afford to be complacent about nuclear proliferation.

Because we are a maritime country New Zealand naturally takes a close interest in the issue of naval armaments and disarmament - both the nuclear and the non-nuclear dimensions. The proposals that have been made by the Government of Sweden on naval confidence-building measures deserve support, in our view, and warrant serious consideration within the multilateral disarmament process.

(Mr. O'Brien, New Zealand)

We are farther today from the prospect of a nuclear war between the super-Powers than at any time in the past 40 years. We have witnessed in recent years important breakthroughs in the area of nuclear disarmament. New Zealand has warmly welcomed the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (IMF), the agreement in principle to reduce strategic nuclear forces, and the signature by the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of verification Protocols to the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty and the threshold test-ban Treaty. These historic bilateral agreements point the way forward to a world based on co-operation rather than military confrontation.

These are major achievements, for which the super-Powers merit our collective acclaim. New Zealand believes none the less that the multilateral process must reinforce, indeed consolidate, the progress that has been made through bilateral negotiations. We accordingly valued our participation in the Secretary-General's Expert Group on Nuclear Weapons, whose recent study provides a comprehensive discussion of issues related to nuclear weapons. We commend it to the attention of all.

The conclusion of a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing is, in our opinion, a vital requirement. New Zealand and Australia will be bringing a draft resolution before the First Committee stressing the urgent need for a comprehensive test ban. More than any other single measure a comprehensive test ban would inhibit the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. It would constitute a major achievement for the security of all if the new spirit of co-operation which now animates relations between the five permanent members of the Security Council were to be translated into a positive response to the General Assembly's call for the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

(Mr. O'Brien, New Zealand)

Agreement in the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee on a nuclear-test ban is encouraging. It should allow the Conference to undertake an in-depth discussion of the multilateral aspects of this issue. We look forward to the establishment of the ad hoc committee in 1991 and the convening of the partial test-ban Treaty amendment conference in January 1991, which will provide a broad-ranging discussion on test-ban issues, a discussion involving all States parties. The sponsors of the conference can obviously contribute to this by devising a draft resolution here that can command the broadest possible support.

It has been argued that a lack of adequate verification techniques constitutes a barrier to the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The recent signature by the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of the verification Protocols to the threshold test-ban Treaty and the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty is particularly welcome. The negotiation and conclusion of detailed verification provisions constitute, in our opinion, important demonstrations of the political will to reach agreement about verification techniques and provide a focus for discussion of comprehensive test-ban verification issues.

Political will on the part of the nuclear-weapons States is, however, not the only component. At the practical level participation in the scientific work on verification, particularly that being carried out by the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts in Geneva, is important. New Zealand is an active member of the Ad Hoc Group. We are participating in the large-scale seismic monitoring experiment currently being undertaken. Our seismic station at Wellington and our communications link to the South Pacific have been updated to ensure an effective role in this experiment. We remain confident that it will demonstrate that an acceptable level of seismic verification is technically possible.

(Mr. O'Brien, New Zealand)

It is a statement of the obvious that in the pursuit of a comprehensive test-ban treaty we should not lose sight of the overall objective, which is the enhancement of global security. We were disappointed that diverging opinions over the testing issue resulted in the recent Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference concluding with no final document. Clearly progress on testing is an important part of the non-proliferation Treaty bargain. No one would deny that. But we need to advance the non-proliferation régime on all fronts. There comes a point where expressions of frustration at the slow progress on testing issues could result in our losing decidedly more than we gain.

(Mr. O'Brien, New Zealand)

It was encouraging to see at the Review Conference the growing consensus for enhancing and strengthening important aspects of the international non-proliferation régime. Other speakers before me, like the representative of the United States, have remarked upon this. There was strong support for full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply and a large measure of agreement was reached on negative security assurances. This progress must not be lost. While a "common formula" on negative security assurances is still to eventuate, it is our hope that the progress evident from the Conference could inspire a resolution on negative security assurances here which commands the support of all delegations. All of us will need to demonstrate flexibility in order to achieve such a result.

Given a comprehensive approach to security, New Zealand's concerns are not nuclear alone. Recent arms control moves in the field of chemical weapons have shown that these munitions pose problems not only in their potential use but also in their physical destruction. This has become an issue in the Pacific as a result of the United States decision to incinerate chemical weapons at Johnston Atoll.

New Zealand, of course, welcomes the recent bilateral agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to eliminate the bulk of their chemical weapons stockpiles. But along with other members of the South Pacific Forum we have expressed concern at the shipment of such weapons into the region from Europe. We therefore particularly welcome assurances from the United States that there will be no further shipments of chemical weapons to Johnston Atoll from outside the region, nor will the destruction facility be retained for other uses, such as toxic waste disposal. We acknowledge the special United States efforts made to inform Pacific countries on the safety precautions of the disposal programmes.

More generally, the way in which the huge arsenals of conventional weapons pose a threat to world peace has been starkly demonstrated by recent events in the Gulf. There have been ground-breaking negotiations on conventional force

(Mr. O'Brien, New Zealand)

reductions in Europe. Other speakers have referred to those. We applaud these efforts. That experience serves to reinforce the basic truism, as we see it, that conventional and nuclear disarmament are complementary parts of a whole. But further significant measures in the field of conventional disarmament are imperative, particularly in the regions of the world where tension threatens stability. The question of collective restraints by producers and sellers, and arms transfers to such regions, must command priority. The United Nations is the obvious candidate for the ongoing role in addressing the issue and monitoring agreement that may flow from collectively agreed action.

Missile technology is likewise a critical matter, given the implications for delivery of weapons of mass destruction. New Zealand strongly supports the missile technology control régime, and believes it has a constructive contribution to make towards stopping the proliferation of missile technology.

To unlock the new opportunities in the multilateral disarmament field, States must make the system itself work more effectively. We can look back with satisfaction at the achievements of this year's Disarmament Commission in beginning to implement the reform guidelines agreed at last year's session. In the Disarmament Commission we need a focused effective agenda; and in the Conference on Disarmament the reforms already identified need now to be pursued.

What all this means is that we must all ensure that this first year of the Third United Nations Disarmament Decade is one of greater genuine achievement for the United Nations in the area of disarmament and security. If ever the time was right for this, it is now.

Mr. VOLLEBAEK (Norway): Mr. Chairman, I should like to warmly congratulate you on your election to preside over the deliberations of this important Committee. I also wish to congratulate the other members of the Bureau and to assure you of the full support of the Norwegian delegation in the conduct of our business.

The forty-fifth session of the General Assembly is taking place against the background of the first major international crisis in the post-cold-war era. The world community has responded with unprecedented cohesion and decisiveness to the brutal Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and rightly so.

Crime must not pay, neither in the relations between individual human beings nor in the relations between States. We must seek a peaceful solution to the present crisis on the basis of full implementation of Security Council resolutions. Any peaceful solution will have to entail complete Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and reinstatement of the lawful authorities of that country.

Since last year's session of the General Assembly, developments in Europe have raced ahead with breathtaking speed. Authoritarian régimes have been replaced by popular movements dedicated to pluralistic democracy, the rule of law and market economy. The emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe have come a long way in an amazingly short time. They are pushing their democratization campaigns forward with determination and courage, often in very difficult circumstances. For the first time in a generation, Europeans all over the continent are pursuing the same aspirations. A common European democratic culture is emerging.

Much of the credit for what is happening on the European continent - and indeed beyond - is due to the new policies pursued by President Gorbachev. For this reason, I welcome the awarding by the Norwegian Nobel Committee of the 1990 Nobel Peace Prize to the President of the Soviet Union. He has made a unique contribution to disarmament and détente in Europe. In fact, he has, together with

(Mr. Vollebaek, Norway)

the leaders of the United States of America, changed totally the nature of East-West relations. Thereby, he has made an essential contribution to the international peace process itself.

The painful post-war division of the European continent is being overcome. German unification was a major step in that direction. The process of German unification was conducted in a manner which deserves our respect and admiration. By taking into account the concerns of others, German unity has become an essential contribution to the creation of a stable and lasting new order of peace for the continent.

These positive developments in the political arena have been accompanied by equally important steps forward in so far as the military aspects of security are concerned. Major achievements have already been made in arms control, and even more spectacular breakthroughs are within reach.

An agreement on conventional forces in Europe (CFE) providing for drastic reductions of conventional armaments in Europe clearly must be seen as an essential part of the foundation of the new Europe. It will benefit the rest of the world, too, making the risk of another major conflict emanating from the continent of Europe significantly smaller. There is not much time, but the progress achieved in recent weeks warrants optimism that the treaty can be ready for signature in connection with the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) summit in November.

A bilateral START treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the reduction of strategic nuclear arms would be yet another historic achievement marking the evolution of East-West relations from an era of confrontation to one of co-operation. We are encouraged to note that the parties have stated their determination to press ahead with a view to completing a START treaty in the near future.

(Mr. Vollebaek, Norway)

Much has been accomplished, but much also remains to be done. Europe is leaving the cold-war order of confrontation and rivalry behind. A new, co-operative order has to come in its place. We are now in the process of drawing up a blueprint for new all-European structures of co-operation. This is a challenging task. Building the new Europe is in many ways as demanding as getting rid of the old.

(Mr. Vollebaek, Norway)

One thing is quite clear: Along with other existing institutions, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Community and the Council of Europe, the Conference on Security and Co-operation (CSCE) will have to play a key role in the new Europe. The CSCE is uniquely suited for this. It is a well-established process of co-operation between the European States and the two North American democracies. The CSCE is thus the framework for a transatlantic partnership for democracy, peace and co-operation. This remains as important in the new Europe as it was in the old.

But in order to serve these functions the CSCE must be strengthened and transformed from a process into an institutional framework. The upcoming Paris CSCE summit will be decisive in this regard. In Paris major decisions will be made providing for new CSCE structures, including a political consultation mechanism encompassing periodic political-level meetings, a political committee, a small secretariat and a crisis-prevention centre. These institutions will give the CSCE a more dynamic character and make it more capable of responding effectively in urgent situations and cases of potential conflict between participating States.

However, although the challenges facing European States are of historic importance, Europe must not become inward-looking and oblivious of problems and conflicts elsewhere. The Gulf crisis has served as a reminder that the stability and prosperity we are all striving to achieve can be threatened by developments outside Europe. There is indeed only one world, and Europe is part of it.

In the multilateral arms control field, the main event in the recent past was the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In the view of Norway, the NPT remains the single most important multilateral agreement on disarmament and arms limitations concluded so far. The consructive atmosphere that prevailed during the preparatory process leading up to the Review Conference and the important achievements in nuclear

(Mr. Vollebaek, Norway)

disarmament over the last few years led us to believe that prospects were good for achieving a balanced, substantive and forward-looking final document. Therefore, it was most regrettable that we did not do so. This means that we have missed an opportunity to present to the world a balanced assessment of the progress achieved in the various fields covered by this Treaty. This is particularly disappointing in a period in which relations between the two major nuclear-weapon Powers are better than they have ever been, and at a time when the number of nuclear weapons in the world is diminishing.

Notwithstanding the lack of a consensus final document, the Review Conference brought to light that strong support for the Treaty is the best guarantee against further proliferation of nuclear weapons. An in-depth review of the functioning of the Treaty was undertaken, and there was agreement on most of the language of what would have been a very substantial final document. There was broad agreement on several measures to strengthen the non-proliferation régime, inter alia on the extension of full-scope safeguards as a condition for exports of nuclear material, equipment and technology, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was requested to study such new approaches in its security control routines as the introduction of random inspections. It is now important that the constructive ideas expressed at the Review Conference be followed up, thus paving the way for an extension of the Treaty in 1995.

The stumbling-block that prevented consensus on a final document at the Review Conference was the question of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The achievement of a total and permanent ban on all nuclear testing remains an important Norwegian disarmament objective. My Government is convinced that the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty is essential in order to halt effectively the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons. We are of the opinion that this

(Mr. Vollebaek, Norway)

question is best dealt with within the Conference on Disarmament. Therefore, we welcome the agreement finally reached in July this year on a mandate for an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban. According to its mandate, the committee will initiate, as a first step towards achieving a nuclear test-ban treaty, substantive work on specific and interrelated test-ban issues, including structure and scope, as well as verification and compliance. We trust that the committee will be re-established at the outset of the 1991 session of the Conference.

We welcome the signing of the verification Protocols to the threshold test-ban Treaty and the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty. We are confident that early ratification of the Treaties and their Protocols will take place, thus enabling the two parties to initiate talks on further constraints on testing.

Let me stress that my Government is very concerned about the environmental and health risks associated with underground nuclear testing, especially in vulnerable environments such as the Arctic. We regard this as an additional reason for the discontinuance of all test explosions. There is indeed clear evidence of the transboundary impacts of nuclear testing, manifested by increased radioactivity even far from test sites. The risk of accidents in connection with testing adds to the concern felt in third countries. We must insist that the nuclear Powers devote special attention to environmental safety measures, including containment of all radioactive venting and leakage.

Norway and the other Nordic countries have therefore expressed their grave concern about Soviet plans to move all its nuclear weapons testing to Novaya Zemlya in the Arctic. Our views have been clearly expressed, and it is our strong hope that this will contribute to the Soviet Union's abstaining from the implementation of any plans in this regard.

(Mr. Vollebaek, Norway)

An effective system of verification is of the utmost importance in any international arms control and disarmament agreement. In a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, international co-operation on the exchange and analysis of seismic data will be one of the main prerequisites for adequate monitoring of compliance. Norway has taken an active part in the efforts of the Conference on Disarmament Group of Scientific Experts to develop a global seismological system to assist in verification of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We believe that the remaining problems of verification can be solved.

The amendment conference of the partial test-ban Treaty will take place at the beginning of next year. Norway will be participating in the conference. We are of the opinion that one of the main objectives should be to give impetus to the work on the test-ban issue in the Conference on Disarmament.

The Iraq-Kuwait conflict demonstrates the urgency of placing the achievement of a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable chemical weapons ban at the very top of our agenda.

Although much work has been done during this year's negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Carl-Magnus Hyltenius of Sweden, no breakthrough has taken place. There has indeed been little progress in 1990 on key questions under negotiation. This applies, for instance, to such vital issues as the right of any party to request an inspection at any time and anywhere within the borders of any State party. For verification to be effective and to ensure the security concerns of all States, this right is an important component of the verification régime of the future chemical weapons convention.

Furthermore, it is of vital importance that all countries possessing chemical weapons follow the example set by the United States and the Soviet Union, and make

(Mr. Vollebaek, Norway)

declarations to that effect. All chemical weapons States should furnish information about the location, composition and size of their stocks. This is, at one and the same time, an important confidence-building measure and a prerequisite for universal adherence to the convention. Moreover, all countries not possessing chemical weapons should also make declarations to that effect. Norway, for its part, has declared that it has no chemical weapons, and that no such weapons will be stationed on Norwegian territory.

(Mr. Vollebaek, Norway)

The time has come for the international community to make every effort to ensure that the threat of chemical weapons be eliminated once and for all. An early breakchrough in the Conference on Disarmament is a prerequisite if this is to be achieved. Intensified efforts are now required in the Conference.

The role of the United Nations has been enhanced over the last few years. The decisiveness of the Security Council in handling the Gulf crisis has given our world Organization improved standing and new prestige. We should see to it that multilateral disarmament, and especially the work of this prestigious Committee, does not lag behind.

There is great potential for improvement which will make the United Nations disarmament efforts more relevant and give them greater impact. Some progress has been made in this Committee, and judging from the experience of the Disarmament Commission, more could be done by way of rationalization.

For many smaller countries the First Committee is the only multilateral disarmament forum where active participation is possible. This right should not be limited, but all countries should proceed with an eye to the most rational and efficient manner in which our objectives can be achieved. No rationalization should imply any kind of limitation on the right of members to introduce new draft resolutions.

We support the initiative taken by you, Mr. Chairman, in order to exploit the possibilities of rationalization of the work of the First Committee. We shall take part in the informal consultations under your leadership, and hope that these efforts will result in the greater efficiency of our work.

The Norwegian Government attaches the utmost importance to multilateral disarmament efforts. We are facing a number of threats which require global solutions. This Committee should take the lead in mapping out future actions.

(Mr. Vollebaek, Norway)

Moreover, the new spirit of international co-operation opens up promising prospects of progress. In order for the United Nations to meet the new challenges in a constructive way it is of vital importance that we work to reach a common understanding of the interdependency of security, economic and ecological factors. In the disarmament field progress towards the achievement of mutually binding agreements could release resources for use in the environmental and development sectors.

My country is prepared to contribute its share to the work ahead. We have already contributed to the work of the Conference on Disarmament for a number of years as an active observer, inter alia by submitting yearly research reports of direct relevance to the work of the Conference. Our research has been concentrated on important aspects of verification of alleged use of chemical weapons and on seismic verification of a nuclear-test ban. It is our hope that it will be possible for Norway, as the endorsed Western candidate for membership, to join the Conference as a full member in 1991. It is high time that the decision to extend the membership of the Conference be implemented. We for our part are ready to devote the resources necessary for us to assume all the responsibilities which full membership entails.

Mr. MORRIS (Australia): In looking today to the future of disarmament, arms control and security in the 1990's, we should also look back at the extraordinary developments of the last year which have helped shape that future so differently from what we may have anticipated.

We have witnessed the dramatic transformation of the international landscape with all its implications for disarmament and for global order.

But it is not simply the removal of the bipolar shape of the post-war era that is important. Put in more human terms, it is the realization of the aspirations,

(Mr. Morris, Australia)

indeed the dreams, of the peoples of Eastern Europe, the most powerful symbol of which was the reunification of Germany on 3 October this year. Not all recent developments, however, are so welcome. The dreams of the people of Kuwait have been rendered nightmares by Iraq's unlawful invasion of their country.

I have used the new power balance between East and West as a symbol of hope. It is depressingly true however that a greater power imbalance continues to plague the world - the imbalance between North and South. Many fear that, as the East-West divide narrows, the gap between North and South will become the leitmotif of international relations. Alvin Toffler, in his recently published book entitled, Power Shift: Knowledge, Wealth and Violence at the Edge of the Twenty-first Century, argues that unless new strategies are developed the split will be between the "fast and the slow". That is, there will be a greater decoupling between those with the most developed economies and those with the least developed. The dangers of such an imbalance are only too obvious. Economic uncertainty can result in resort to the use of force. With diminishing economic power and a consequent rise in political opposition and instability, it is still all too frequent that countries do what rulers have done since the origins of the nation State: reach for the most primitive form of power - military force.

The danger of allowing the economic gap to widen therefore is all too apparent - already far too many countries - including countries that can least afford it - are diverting scarce resources from health, education and social and infrastructural development to the acquisition of increasingly sophisticated and destructive weapons. Some even seek to develop weapons of mass destruction.

It is bad enough that those countries which currently possess weapons of mass destruction have yet to rid their arsenals of them. But a world in which nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and biological weapons were more widely possessed - in

(Mr. Morris, Australia)

particular in regions of tension - would be even more dangerous and threatening. Accordingly, as we look to the 1990s, particularly in the area of disarmament, we should not lose sight of the need to remove the sources, both political and economic, which fuel military aggression and which result in the build-up of forces and armaments.

The United Nations has identified the elimination of nuclear weapons as the disarmament priority. Australia welcomes the progress that has been recorded in this area - particularly in the ongoing Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). Nevertheless, the level of nuclear weapons remains unacceptably high.

It will be so even after the cuts envisaged are implemented. Accordingly, while acknowledging that reductions in nuclear arsenals are necessarily a slow and complex process, Australia is convinced that in the decade leading up to the twenty-first century, greater progress must be made.

Intrinsically linked with nuclear disarmament is the need for a comprehensive test-ban treaty which would ban nuclear testing by all States in all environments for all time. We find it difficult to reconcile continued testing at a time when nuclear weapons are being eliminated by those possessing them, and when the threat of other threshold States acquiring the technology increasingly is growing.

Together with New Zealand, Australia again will promote a draft resolution in the First Committee entitled "Urgent need for a comprehensive test ban". We hope that this draft resolution, with its support for the on-going work of the Conference on Disarmament, will guide the way for the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban at the earliest possible date.

Although Australia continues to believe that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body, is the appropriate venue for comprehensive test-ban negotiations, we understand none the less the frustration at

(Mr. Morris, Australia)

the lack of progress there which had led some States to propose the achievement of a comprehensive test ban through another mechanism, that of converting the existing partial test-ban Treaty. Australia supports the call for the early achievement of a comprehensive test ban but is conscious that that Conference will see the expression of widely differing views. We are nevertheless convinced that valuable work to assist preparations for a comprehensive test ban can be undertaken at the Conference and we will participate constructively to this end.

As I noted before - technology is a two-edged sword which can be employed for economic development or for the development of evermore powerful weapons. In the 1990s, while ensuring the need for all to have a piece of the technology pie, it is also necessary for States, unilaterally and multilaterally, to restrain themselves, and others, from diverting technologies to destructive ends.

(Mr. Morris, Australia)

In the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the international community sought for the first time to control destructive effects of a technology while making its peaceful uses available. In the NPT it took a deliberate step to change the historical trend of new technologies always being turned to military purposes. The NPT was a bold statement of commitment to constructing a better future. There continues to be a vital role for this Treaty as a permament feature of the international security framework.

In the 1990s, we need further bold steps forward. The momentous changes to the international order have given us a better chance to make the world safer from the threat of nuclear weapons and other forms of proliferation than at any time since the end of the Second World War.

For Australia in the 1990s, a most urgent priority is the conclusion in the Conference on Disarmament of a global chemical-weapons convention. All too often in recent years the world has been reminded of the ugly spectre of chemical weapons. Many years of work in the Conference on Disarmament have produced a firm framework for a comprehensive chemical weapons convention, and we now have the opportunity, indeed the obligation, to bring these negotiations to a successful conclusion. Australia places high priority on the early achievement of the convention, and will continue to work intensively and imaginatively in the Conference on Disarmament, and to undertake a range of practical activities which facilitate reaching that goal. At present, our conviction is that the most pressing need is for vigorous political commitment and direction, and it is with this in mind that Foreign Minister Senator Evans added his voice to the growing calls for a ministerial-level meeting next year. We urge all countries to meet the challenge of this complex, but absolutely worth-while task.

(Mr. Morris, Australia)

Non-proliferation measures which limit the transfer of technologies to countries not possessing them can sometimes cause resentment and misunderstanding. This derives from the point I made before about the essentiality of technology for the development of economies.

Those resentments derive partly from the perception that some consider it to be all right for some countries to have certain weapons systems but not for others. But let us not exaggerate such concerns. Australia participates in several non-proliferation régimes, the most notable of which is the NPT, under which Australia has undertaken not to acquire nuclear weapons. Australia is also a central player in the Australia Group, which seeks to control the export of certain sensitive chemicals and chemical technologies. Most recently Australia joined the missile-technology control régime. None the less, Australia's position is quite clear. We do not see these as avenues for preventing the transfer of necessary technologies to any other State. We see them as interim measures, pending the conclusion of disarmament agreements. Nuclear non-proliferation is not a substitute for nuclear disarmament. Chemical export controls are not a substitute for a global verifiable chemical-weapons convention. Missile technology controls are not a substitute for removing the causes of tension which lead to the acquisition of missiles.

In the next ten years, despite the new face and new resolve of the United Nations, it is likely that regional tensions will persist and that, regrettably, regional conflicts will break out.

The dangers of States diverting too much capital to expenditure on weapons has already been pointed out, as has the potential that the downward spiral of economic stagnation reinforced by such expenditures will increase the likelihood of the use

(Mr. Morris, Australia)

of force. It is imperative, therefore, that States exercise restraint in the transfer of arms and that such transfers be carried out with openness and transparency.

Removing the sources of political and economic tension which lead to instability is not simple - nor will it be in the years to come as regions increasingly become fluid in their strategic environments as a result of the subsidence of East-West polarization.

The prevention of regional conflict will be enhanced by mediation and by peace-making and peace-keeping efforts of the United Nations. It will also be enhanced by the development of regional arrangements which could include developing processes that one day might evolve into specific frameworks for confidence-building measures and for addressing and resolving security problems.

The most interesting regional security development over the last year has been the rapidly increasing interest throughout the Asia-Pacific region in developing more systematic dialogues on security issues. It may be that at some later stage in this process or dialogue some form or structure may be seen as timely. But at this stage, better processes of dialogue need to be commenced and new patterns of co-operation among countries in the Asia-Pacific region need to be explored. The development of these processes will establish a basis upon which countries in the region together could construct a dialogue on the region's security concerns.

As we approach the twenty-first century we have many challenges ahead of us. How we cope with these challenges will determine whether we have a world of divisions, of violence and of increasing change to all its peoples or whether we have a different, safer and more peaceful world.

(Mr. Morris, Australia)

The dream of creating a world in which a decent standard of living, peace and social justice prevail - the dream enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations - is as noble and as widely shared as ever. But such a world cannot rise from old foundations of violence, weaponry and war-making.

A historic opportunity to realize our dreams awaits us, if we take the actions to deserve it.

In the words of the recent Nobel laureate, Octavio Paz:

> "When history sleeps, it speaks in dreams: on the forehead of the sleeping people, the poem is a constellation of blood. When history wakes image becomes act, the poem happens: poetry moves into action.
>
> "Deserve your dream."

Mrs. URIBE de LOZANO (Colombia) (interpretation from Spanish): I should like to take this opportunity to extend to you, Sir, my delegation's congratulations on your election as Chairman of the First Committee. Your election clearly reflects the high esteem and great confidence we all have in you. We should also like to extend our congratulations to the other members of the Bureau and pledge our fullest co-operation to everyone in the tasks we are undertaking.

Efforts to halt the arms race, in particular the nuclear-arms race, have a long history in the United Nations. In 1990, as we begin the Third Disarmament Decade, we believe that it is timely to recall the postulates of the Final Act of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which was held in 1978:

> "The ending of the arms race and the achievement of real disarmament are tasks of primary importance and urgency. To meet this historic challenge is in the political and economic interests of all the nations and peoples of the world as well as in the interests of ensuring their genuine security and peaceful future.

(Mrs. Uribe de Lozano, Colombia)

"Unless its avenues are closed, the continued arms race means a growing threat to international peace and security and even to the very survival of mankind. The nuclear and conventional arms build-up threatens to stall the efforts aimed at reaching the goals of development, to become an obstacle on the road of achieving the new international economic order and to hinder the solution of other vital problems facing mankind." (S-10/2, paras. 1 and 2)

Twelve years have elapsed since this historic document was adopted. But the goal of the United Nations continues to be the creation of a just and peaceful world in which disputes are resolved through negotiations and not by force of arms.

(Mrs. Uribe de Lozano, Colombia)

Clearly, the attitude States take with regard to the arms race can either lead us to that goal or prevent us from attaining it. The maintenance of a reasonable defensive capability may seem a legitimate goal, but to encourage the arms race and exacerbate tensions may lead to armed conflicts and even to a world war in which there can be neither winners nor losers.

Only a few days ago the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was concluded. Unsuccessful efforts were made to reach agreement on a final declaration, and that situation gives rise to disturbing thoughts about the Treaty's future and its effectiveness beyond 1995.

That Conference afforded States Parties to the Treaty an exceptional opportunity to strengthen their commitment to erecting a higher barrier against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the nuclear-arms race in general. However, the strengthening of the Treaty requires full compliance with the obligations it entails, both by the nuclear-weapon States and by States that do not possess nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, reality demands that we view with a certain pessimism the possibility of a régime that would prevent both the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Although some steps have been taken in the right direction, there are today more nuclear warheads in the world than there were when the Non-Proliferation Treaty was adopted. Notwithstanding the results of the future treaty on the reduction of strategic arms (START), both super-Powers still possess no less than 30,000 nuclear warheads that are still undergoing improvements. Since 1968 a growing number of countries have acquired the capability of producing nuclear weapons, and some of them are reluctant to make their nuclear facilities subject to the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Furthermore, the

(Mrs. Uribe de Lozano, Colombia)

non-proliferation process will be incomplete unless it is based on a total nuclear-test ban, and, as we all know, the rhetoric of the nuclear Powers omits mention of that goal.

The principle of universality in the United Nations has great practical value in many contexts and particularly in the context of disarmament. The spirit that prevailed at the time the Non-Proliferation Treaty was negotiated clearly demonstrated that the principle of universality is a fundamental element in the régime established thereunder, which was designed to bring all States together to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Our delegation once again urges that an effort be made to ensure that States not parties to the Treaty, be they nuclear-weapon States or not, accede to it as soon as possible, thereby contributing to dispelling the doubts and difficulties that continue to exist with regard to that Treaty.

The end of the cold war and the end of the bipolar confrontation between the super-Powers have given hope for new relations among States that would remove the spectre of regional conflicts. However, once again events have left our predictions and desires high and dry.

There can be no doubt that Iraq's attack against its neighbour Kuwait surprised a world that was not expecting a new military adventure in the midst of the newly created spirit of détente. Is there any question that that military adventure was inspired by the frantic arms trade generated by the high oil prices that have turned the area into a major destination for ever-more-sophisticated death-dealing machinery? Can we be surprised that a crisis arose in an area that has for over 15 years been a veritable paradise for arms dealers of all kinds, dealers who abetted the 8-year war between Iran and Iraq and encouraged the belligerent attitudes that led to the insane arms race in that region? Did the

(Mrs. Uribe de Lozano, Colombia)

countries supplying such weapons never imagine that they were contributing to escalating an already volatile and tense situation?

Nothing can justify an act of aggression. Unfortunately, however, the world is today a victim of its own creation: the militarization of its societies. As the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, stated:

"The generosity of the suppliers has made it possible for the recipients to opt for military solutions to regional disputes rather than resolving them by peaceful means."

What has happened so far - even though war has not yet broken out - is enough to give us pause, to chasten us and to make us consider the change that is needed if we are to make a real attempt at curbing the manufacture of and unscrupulous trade in weapons and at putting an end to the profit mentality that has encouraged the present situation.

Present-day history would be quite different if, instead of an arms race, we had opted for the path of development and had tried to give the peoples of the world a living standard in keeping with their aspirations for peace and progress. However, we are experiencing the after-effects of the cold war, which was not a heroic episode but, rather, a wasted stretch of time in the process of improving human lives, one that has led the world to a situation in which it is now held hostage to lethal weapons and in which there is a prevailing paranoia in which one faction of mankind has regarded the other as its enemy.

Unfortunately there are still enemies to justify the arms race and recourse to war. Today, speaking at the Headquarters of the United Nations, we say to the instigators of new wars that they themselves are accountable to mankind for the threat of a military catastrophe that would be a thousand times worse than the world has ever seen before.

(Mrs. Uribe de Lozano, Colombia)

The need for disarmament is particularly urgent now, when international security is being so flagrantly threatened. If the present crisis teaches us anything it is that the constant arms build-up subjugates and corrupts society and that only if men show a determination to renounce war and violence as instruments for settling vital questions will there be peace.

Notwithstanding the imminent threat of war, some arms-producing countries seem all-too unwilling to forgo an opportunity to make money or to exploit their quarrels or ideologies - or to pay back certain favours by selling war matériel, even when they know that such actions serve to promote the arms race and to escalate serious conflict situations.

For some time now Colombia has been saying that so long as war continues to be a lucrative business there will be no peace. Only when Governments have the wisdom and the courage to understand that the vast resources being invested in weapons can, if properly allocated, solve problems of housing, health, education and security itself, will there be a chance of ending violence where it is rampant; and that there will be peace only when false pride and the arrogance of force are set aside.

As participants in the Group of Governmental Experts on the problem of international arms transfers, we shall continue to stress the harmful consequences of such activities, which are today particularly evident and irrefutable. We shall continue to urge an international course of conduct that will eliminate the indiscriminate trade in weapons, and we shall fight to put an end to the arms race and to see to it that it does not continue to poison the lives of our peoples.

For mankind today peace must be seen as an instrument of conscience, a marvellous instrument for achieving the well-being of all men and all societies - indeed, peace must be an unquenchable passion.

The CHAIRMAN: There are no other names on the list of speakers for this afternoon's meeting. However, one representative wishes to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

Before I call on him, I should like to draw the Committee's attention to the following General Assembly decisions. Delegations should exercise their right of reply at the end of the day whenever two meetings have been scheduled for that day and whenever such meetings are devoted to the consideration of the same item. The number of interventions in exercise of the right of reply for any delegation at a given meeting should be limited to two. The first intervention in exercise of the right of reply for any delegation on any item at a given meeting should be limited to ten minutes and the second intervention should be limited to five minutes.

I call on the representative of Iraq, who wishes to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

Mr. MALIK (Iraq) (interpretation from Arabic): Since this is the first time I have spoken before this Committee, I wish to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman and the Bureau, on behalf of the Iraqi delegation, on your assumption of the task of steering the work of the Committee. I also wish to express the willingness of the Iraqi delegation to co-operate with you.

I wish to make the following observations of my delegation in exercise of the right of reply to the statement made by the representative of the United States of America here this morning.

In speaking of the genuine peace to which he aspires, the United States representative seems to have forgotten the fact that the huge, unprecedented American build-up in the Arab Gulf area poses a grave threat to peace and security in the region and is a naked threat to Iraq's security and sovereignty.

Secondly, if the United States representative is really keen on the security of the region's peoples as he claims, and is really interested in peace, then the peaceful initiative by Mr. Saddam Hussein, President of the Republic of Iraq,

(Mr. Malik, Iraq)

constitutes the right and realistic way to solve all the problems of the region. It is a sincere initiative which aims at sparing the region the horrors of a catastrophic war.

Thirdly, the United States representative shed a lot of tears when he spoke of the dangers of chemical weapons. However, he forgot, once again, to mention that in the meeting between the President of Iraq and the United States congressional delegation headed by Senator Dole, Iraq declared its readiness to establish a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction, including the nuclear weapons possessed by one single entity, side by side with chemical weapons. Moreover, the Arab Summit Conference held in Baghdad in May 1990 adopted that objective and made clear the way it could be achieved.

Fourthly, the United States representative claimed that his country works for the success of disarmament efforts. Those claims, however, mask a process of qualitative rearmament through which the United States gets rid of obsolete weapons of diminished capability and exchanges them for more advanced high-capability weapons. The evidence is the following: greater funds allocated to the strategic defence initiative; a greater United States military budget; and increased production of sophisticated American weaponry. Furthermore, the United States was the country that prevented consensus at the Fourth Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by its insistence on continuing nuclear testing.

Fifthly, in conclusion, I have to denounce the way the United States representative spoke of the world order in the post-cold-war era, at the conclusion of his statement. His words show quite clearly that it is the intention of the United States to become the sole leader of an imperialist approach which is a throw-back to the early twentieth century. Iraq will not bend to United States threats and will not allow this aggressive approach to pass through Iraq.

The meeting rose at 4.40 p.m.

UNITED NATIONS

General Assembly

FORTY-FIFTH SESSION

Official Records

FIRST COMMITTEE
6th meeting
held on
Wednesday, 17 October 1990
at 10 a.m.
New York

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 6th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. RANA (Nepal)

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Distr. GENERAL
A/C.1/45/PV.6
24 October 1990
ENGLISH

90-63040 2298V (E)

The meeting was called to order at 10.25 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 45 TO 66 (continued) AND 155

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT AGENDA ITEMS

The CHAIRMAN: The first speaker is the representative of Romania who, in his capacity as current President of the Conference on Disarmament, will introduce the report of the Conference.

Mr. CHIRILA (Romania), President of the Conference on Disarmament (interpretation from French): First of all, Sir, permit me as current President of the Conference on Disarmament to congratulate you warmly on your assumption of the chairmanship of the First Committee. Your personal and professional qualities will guarantee the success of the Committee's deliberations. Our consultations and exchanges of views during your visit to Geneva last August, accompanied by the Secretary of the First Committee, Mr. Kheradi, reinforce that conviction.

I have asked to speak in my capacity as President of the Conference on Disarmament in order to introduce the report of the Conference on its 1990 session.

The year 1990 was marked by basic, unprecedented changes on the international scene. With respect to the Conference on Disarmament, there are further signs of heightened interest by the international community. I need only mention, for example, the sizeable number of government representatives who addressed the Conference or sent messages to it.

The report of the Conference on Disarmament on this year's session was issued as Conference document CD/1039 of 30 August 1990, and has been published as Suppplement No. 27 to the Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-fifth Session (A/45/27).

(Mr. Chirila, President, Conference on Disarmament)

The document, which summarizes the debates and negotiations of the 1990 session, is the result of numerous, sustained consultations and important informal work to harmonize positions and reach consensus.

Chapter II of the report concerns the organization of work. The Conference was in session during 1990 from 6 February to 24 April and from 12 June to 24 August. The chapter contains a summary of various questions, notably the agenda and the programme of work for the session, the participation of member States in the proceedings of the Conference, the chairmanships, the participation of non-member States, the expansion of the membership of the Conference, and its improved and effective functioning. I wish to draw attention to the decision adopted by the Conference (CD/1036), contained in paragraph 17, dealing with, among other things, the amendment of certain rules of procedure and a simplification of some aspects of the Conference's work.

I wish in particular to point out that future annual sessions of the Conference will be divided into three parts, rather than the two that have been the rule so far, without affecting their total length - that is, 24 weeks.

The chapter also deals with measures adopted by the Conference relating to the financial situation, as well as communications from non-governmental organizations.

Chapter III concerns the substantive work of the Conference during its 1990 session. This part of the report summarizes the deliberations on various agenda items as well as the positions advanced by groups and delegations on the various questions considered by the Conference.

During the session the Conference established organizational frameworks to deal with each of the agenda items. The most noteworthy fact was the re-establishment, after long informal consultations conducted by Ambassador Donawaki

(Mr. Chirila, President, Conference on Disarmament)

of Japan and his predecessor, Ambassador Yamada, of the Ad Hoc Committee to deal with the first agenda item, "Nuclear-test ban". The Committee's re-establishment, after a seven-year interruption of its work, was welcomed with satisfaction as an important step to prepare the ground for subsequent consideration of such an important problem. The Ad Hoc Committee agreed that the subtantive work on this agenda item should be continued at the 1991 session of the Conference. We should give our full attention in the future to working for the maintenance and, if possible, the consolidation of the consensus on the establishment and functioning of the Ad Hoc Committee on that first agenda item, "Nuclear-test ban". I hope that the consultations held between sessions, particularily with the contribution of Ambassador Donawaki of Japan, will create the conditions in which that goal may be attained.

The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic events continued its consideration of the Group's second technical test (GSETT-2). The test was deemed to be of particular importance, and it was recommended that other States participate in it. The participation of individual members of the Group of Experts in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban was appreciated, and it was the general view that the Ad Hoc Committee should continue to meet with experts in the Group.

The convening of special informal meetings on agenda items 2 and 3, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" and "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", made possible a more structured debate in the Conference on these problems. The substantive discussion of those questions is reflected in the relevant parts of the annual report.

The most burning issue in the Conference continued to be the negotiations on the conclusion of a multilateral convention on the complete and effective

(Mr. Chirila, President, Conference on Disarmament)

prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. Although, in the general view, the real consensus in the international community had not been translated into a desirable substantial progress in elaborating the draft convention, the quality and quantity of the work put into the matter, as well as the clarification achieved on an increasing number of key problems in the convention, give reason to hope not only that consensus will be consolidated, but that the Conference will soon be able to speed up negotiations with a view to concluding the convention in the near future.

Many delegations believe that a political initiative in the form of a session of the Conference at the foreign-minister level could make a big contribution to that. I wish to emphasize that the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, ably chaired by Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, will resume consultations open to all from 26 November to 21 December this year, and will hold a short session from 8 to 18 January next year.

The deliberations of the Ad Hoc Committee dealing with agenda item 5, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", are reported in paragraphs 116 to 118. The debate consisted essentially of an exchange of views on the Committee's programme of work. The Committee continued to consider existing proposals and to give preliminary consideration to new proposals and initiatives. It was agreed that substantive work on this agenda item should be continued at the next session of the Conference. In its conclusions, which appear in paragraphs 63 to 65 of its report, the Committee recommended that it be re-established at the beginning of the 1991 session.

In paragraphs 19 and 20 of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or

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Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, dealing with agenda item 6, the Committee recommends that the Conference continue to pursue ways and means to overcome the difficulties encountered in the efforts successfully to conclude the negotiations on this matter. It was also agreed that the Ad Hoc Committee should be re-established at the beginning of the 1991 session.

The Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, dealing with agenda item 7, whose work is reflected in paragraphs 122 to 126, continued to consider two groups of questions - the prohibition of radiological weapons in the traditional sense and issues relevant to the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities. As can be seen from the Committee's conclusions and recommendations, contained in paragraph 10 of its report, the work of the Ad Hoc Committee during its 1990 session contributed further to the clarification of different approaches on radiological weapons, and it recommended that the Conference re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee at the beginning of its 1991 session, with the annexes to its report forming the basis for its future work.

(Mr. Chirila, President, Conference on Disarmament)

As is stated in paragraph 133, concerning the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, it was agreed that the organizational framework to deal with this agenda item will be considered at the beginning of the 1991 session.

As I conclude my presentation of the report of the Conference on Disarmament, I should like to emphasize above all the positive atmosphere that reigned at the 1990 session. The present ongoing dialogue in international relations, particularly with regard to disarmament and the political settlement of many conflicts, contributed to that constructive atmosphere in the Conference as well as to a demonstration of a greater sense of responsibility. Developments in the national policies of various countries and the reappraisal of political, strategic and military concepts can provide an impetus for the Conference's efforts to carry out its task while at the same time strengthening its role as a negotiating body. The decisions adopted at the 1990 session to enhance the functioning and efficacy of the Conference by adjusting its work to conform to the new international facts are a step in that direction. This effort should be intensified in order to improve the functioning of the Conference in all respects, and more committed political will must also be shown.

The increased interest in the work of the Conference is reflected in the growing number of States not members of the Conference - 39 - that participated in its work, the larger participation of statesmen in plenary meetings, the many messages addressed to the Conference by Governments, and the important proposals submitted under various agenda items. All these factors support the view that the Conference's efforts will lead to more meaningful progress in the future.

Of course, the annual report of the Conference that I have just presented is a reflection of the collective effort of the members of the Conference to express

(Mr. Chirila, President, Conference on Disarmament)

their determination to overcome differing views and to ensure movement towards increased agreement not only on the way disarmament is perceived but also on the need for a common co-operative effort in the specific sphere of multilateral disarmament negotiations.

I should like to express again my thanks to all the members of the Conference, to the Chairmen of the ad hoc committees and to the Secretariat as a whole, very competently led by the Secretary-General of the Conference, Mr. Komatina. Their co-operation was very valuable to me in carrying out my task - as always, a delicate one - of preparing the annual report.

In conclusion, I express the hope that the experience we have gained and the positive results we have achieved at our session this year, as well as the debates and recommendations of the General Assembly, will provide the bases for more meaningful progress in future work of the Conference on Disarmament, in keeping with the times and the demands of international life.

Mr. DONOWAKI (Japan): Mr. Chairman, my delegation wishes to join others in extending to you, Sir, sincere congratulations on your election as Chairman of this important Committee. My delegation is convinced that, under your able guidance and with your skill, the Committee will be able to fulfil its task successfully. We wish to extend our congratulations also to the other officers of the Committee on their election.

During the course of the year since we met at the forty-fourth session of the General Assembly we have witnessed enormous changes in the international situation, changes that are taking place at bewildering speed. We are now entering a crucial era of transition as we search for new world order. The cold war between the East and the West is becoming a thing of the past. The process of dialogue and

(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)

co-operation instead of confrontation that began in Europe has expanded to other regions as well and now shows signs of spreading world-wide. However, in spite of such a bright prospect, the collapse of peace in the Gulf region following the unforgivable Iraqi invasion of Kuwait amply demonstrates that the post-cold-war era on the eve of the twenty-first century is replete with dangers and uncertainties.

Of ever greater urgency today is the question of how to structure, maintain and strengthen global arrangements against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as of missiles and other delivery vehicles for such weapons. It is for this reason that arms control and disarmament have become the concern not only of the military super-Powers or of the Eastern and Western military blocs, but of all regions and all nations.

In this connection, Japan wholeheartedly welcomes the recent remarkable achievements in the field of arms control and disarmament between the United States and the Soviet Union as well as in Europe - such as the smooth implementation of the Treaty on the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles (INF Treaty), the progress in the strategic arms reduction talks (START), the signing of the United States-Soviet agreement on the destruction and non-production of chemical weapons, the progress in the negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe and on confidence- and security-building measures, and so forth. Japan strongly hopes that these achievements will have a positive influence on the ongoing multilateral talks and negotiations on arms control and disarmament being pursued in other international forums such as the Conference on Disarmament.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons provides a very important legal framework in ensuring the compatibility of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and, consequently, in

(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)

securing the safety of the world. Japan believes that each State party to the Treaty should faithfully abide by the obligations of the Treaty in all of its three aspects - namely, non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The fourth Review Conference of the parties to the Treaty achieved something significant by carrying out in-depth deliberations in all those three areas. In this sense, the review was more thoroughgoing than any of those carried out at the three previous Review Conferences, although, regrettably, the final declaration of the Conference was not adopted by consensus, despite the tireless efforts of delegations attending the Conference during the course of meetings night after night.

(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)

In the second main committee of the Conference, which dealt with concrete measures for non-proliferation, the need for the further strengthening of the non-proliferation régime was commonly recognized and various concrete and constructive proposals were made both in the area of the control of exports of nuclear materials and equipment and in the area of the safeguards régime. Among them, the unqualified obligation of States parties for the conclusion and the entering into force of an NPT-type safeguards agreement has been confirmed. A consensus has been reached to require the application of full-scope safeguards as a necessary condition for the transfer of nuclear materials and equipment to non-nuclear-weapon States.

In the third main committee, which dealt with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, it was emphasized that measures should be taken to give preferential treatment to the developing States parties to the Treaty. Also, the strong interest of the international community in the safety of nuclear installations was shown.

Furthermore, in the first main committee, which dealt with nuclear disarmament, a broad, common understanding was reached with respect to the question of non-proliferation under articles I and II of the Treaty. Meaningful progress was also achieved in the discussion of the question of the security assurances to be offered to non-nuclear-weapon States.

As a whole it may well be concluded that the Fourth Review Conference succeeded in preparing a useful basis for the 1995 Treaty extension conference. The participation for the first time, as observers, of the People's Republic of China and France was another noteworthy event from the viewpoint of enhancing the universality of the Treaty. Naturally, Japan takes the view that the nuclear-non-proliferation Treaty should be extended well beyond 1995 and Japan will spare no effort in strengthening the NPT régime.

(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)

In view of the sincere desire of the Japanese people that a nuclear tragedy should never take place again, Japan has over the years been exerting considerable efforts to ensure the achievement of a nuclear test-ban. Therefore, Japan cannot but express its deep regret that underground testing of nuclear explosions is carried out every year.

A comprehensive test-ban is an important issue in the field of nuclear disarmament. Recognizing that the question of a comprehensive test-ban is intricately interwoven with the very basis of the national security of States, Japan believes it important to make steady, step-by-step progress toward the achievement of such a test-ban as part of an effective process of nuclear disarmament.

It is from this viewpoint that Japan welcomes in particular the re-establishment by the Conference on Disarmament this year of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban in order to resume substantive work on this agenda item after a lapse of seven years. Also in this connection Japan highly appreciates the flexibility demonstrated on this question by the various States concerned.

It is Japan's earnest hope that the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban will be re-established at the beginning of the 1991 session of the Conference on Disarmament under the same mandate as it has had this year, in order to continue substantive work on a nuclear test-ban. Japan for its part is determined to continue to make positive contributions to the work. Furthermore, Japan strongly hopes that all the nuclear weapon States will participate in the work of the Committee.

The establishment of a global system for detecting seismic events will be indispensable to the achievement of a comprehensive test-ban. In this regard Japan highly appreciates the useful work being undertaken by the Group of Scientific

(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)

Experts within the Conference on Disarmament and urges as many States as possible to participate in the Group's second large-scale technical test.

As for the partial test-ban Treaty Amendment Conference, to be held in New York in January next year, Japan regards this Conference as providing another opportunity to discuss various ways to achieve a comprehensive test-ban. In view of the widely held interest in this question - evidenced at the latest NPT Review Conference - Japan hopes that the discussion at the coming Amendment Conference will turn out to be as constructive as possible by way of co-operation and mutual understanding between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. It is from this viewpoint that Japan will participate in the Conference. At the same time, Japan wishes to reiterate that the most realistic way to arrive at the goal of a comprehensive test-ban is through a step-by-step approach to the question in the Conference on Disarmament, which is the only multilateral negotiating body on questions of arms control and disarmament.

Furthermore, Japan welcomes the signature of verification Protocols to the United States-Soviet threshold test-ban Treaty and peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty and the subsequent ratification of the Treaties and Protocols. Japan is eagerly waiting for the United States and the Soviet Union to proceed - as soon as possible - to the next intermediate stage of negotiations in accordance with the full-scale and stage-by-stage approach agreed upon by all countries in September 1987.

In view of the growing concern about the use and proliferation of chemical weapons, the early conclusion of a verifiable and universally adhered-to convention on the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons has become a matter of great importance and urgency. As a major concrete step towards this goal, in June this year the United States and the Soviet Union concluded a bilateral treaty by which

(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)

the two nations undertook to destroy most of their chemical weapons and to cease their production. Japan sincerely welcomes this development.

In the wake of last year's January Paris Conference and September Canberra Government and Industry Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons, expectations were high that substantial progress would be made in the negotiations on the convention in the Conference on Disarmament. Unfortunately, however, the negotiation has been stalled on several crucial questions, such as that relating to verification. As is often the case the final stage is the hardest negotiators have to face. It is at this stage that differences in positions which have not been fully addressed come to the surface. It is at this stage also that strong political will on the part of States parties to the negotiations becomes indispensable in order to achieve a breakthrough.

The negotiations for the conclusion of the chemical-weapons convention are unique in that their aim is to conclude a truly epoch-making, multilateral disarmament convention with an unprecedentedly wide scope. In the course of the negotiations we are required to take into account all the other existing arms-control and disarmament treaties and conventions, while at the same time we ought to make headway in surpassing all of them.

One of the most significant aspects which characterizes these negotiations is the question of a verification régime as envisaged in the convention. It would naturally be too much to expect to establish a 100-per-cent-foolproof verification mechanism. Therefore, what is important today is to produce as soon as possible a draft convention that contains a verification mechanism which is both effective and reasonably reliable, taking into account the cost-benefit aspect of such a mechanism as well as the experiences of national trial inspections conducted by a number of States.

(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)

Japan wishes to take this opportunity to reaffirm that it neither possesses nor intends to possess any chemical weapons and to announce its intention to become - together with other States - one of the original signatory States to the convention upon the successful conclusion of the negotiation.

The United Nations is the most important universal organization of the family of nations in today's world and the First Committee of the General Assembly continues to play its important role as a forum where views representing the sincere aspiration of all nations to a world free of armaments are brought together and frankly debated.

(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)

This year the Conference on Disarmament came to agree upon certain specific measures to improve and enhance its functioning. In addition, the United Nations Disarmament Commission adopted a set of important rationalization measures. Japan hopes that the First Committee, for its part, will also endeavour, as it did last year, to reduce the number of draft resolutions to be adopted. With due regard to the changing international situation, every effort should be made to avoid the adoption of too many draft resolutions, to merge similar draft resolutions and to adopt them by consensus whenever possible. In this way, the messages coming out from this Committee, to be conveyed to the international community, will become clearer in their meanings and will no doubt gain greater importance.

There is also another important area of United Nations activities related to disarmament. This year, under the sponsorship of the Department for Disarmament Affairs, a regional meeting on Confidence Building Measures in the Asia-Pacific region was held in Kathmandu, Nepal, and a conference entitled "New Trends in Science and Technology: Implications for International Peace and Stability" was held in Sendai, Japan. Both of them were extremely successful in promoting international understanding of disarmament problems through the participation of experts from different professions and through the exchange of views from a broad interdisciplinary perspective. Japan intends to continue to contribute to such United Nations activities in co-operation with the Department for Disarmament Affairs. Yet another example of United Nations activities is the report on the question of verification submitted by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly. Japan intends to give serious consideration to the recommendations contained in that report. Moreover, Japan hopes that the ongoing study by a group of experts on the question of the transfer of conventional weapons will produce useful conclusions.

(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)

There is no doubt about the very important role arms control and disarmament can play for the peace and stability of the world. At the same time, in the real world, we have to realize that there is no magic wand that can bring about an instant Utopia. Rather, we have to tackle each of the issues patiently and realistically, while at the same time taking into account carefully the security requirements of nations. Only through such an approach will we be able to make progress towards the achievement of a workable and verifiable system of arms control and disarmament.

In the years since the Second World War, Japan has been guided, under its Peace Constitution, by the solemn resolve of its people not to become again a military Power menacing its neighbours, but rather to contribute to the stability of the world through peaceful means. Thus, Japan has been abiding by its three non-nuclear principles and enforcing strict arms export restrictions. It is from this same viewpoint that new draft legislation, entitled the "United Nations Peace Co-operation Law", is under consideration in the Diet. As was stated by Mr. Nakayama, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, in his statement to the General Assembly on 25 September, the aim of the legislation is to enable Japan to assume greater responsibilities regarding United Nations activities for preserving international peace and security, and to participate in international efforts in support of those activities.

I should like to conclude my statement by reiterating that Japan will continue to work together with all other States and, in particular, with the United Nations, as the most important organization of the family of nations, for the cause of international peace and security.

Mr. HOU Zhitong (China) (interpretation from Chinese): At the outset, please allow me to express, on behalf of the Chinese delegation, warm

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congratulations to you - a prominent representative from China's friendly neighbouring country - on your election as Chairman of the First Committee of the General Assembly at its current session. I am convinced that with your rich experience and outstanding diplomatic ability you will fulfil your noble mission with efficiency. I also wish to congratulate the other members of the Bureau upon their election. I can assure you that, under your chairmanship, the Chinese delegation will co-operate closely with the Bureau and with other delegations. Meanwhile, I would like to take this opportunity to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Taylhardat, for his remarkable contributions.

This year marks the beginning of the 1990s and the Third Disarmament Decade. Looking back on the 1980s, the world witnessed an extraordinary historical period. Thanks to the joint efforts of the people of all countries, some progress was made in the course of the Second Disarmament Decade, the force for disarmament and peace has been strengthened and military confrontation reduced. At present, the world is undergoing profound changes. Germany has achieved its unification, regional co-operation has increased and the trend towards multipolarization is developing more markedly. However, in the present-day world, many political, economic, national and other contradictions still exist and power politics are yet to be eliminated from the historical arena. In some regions, tense and complex situations have emerged. The world is at a juncture where the old world pattern is being replaced by a new one. The establishment of a new international political order on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence has become the demand of our time.

In recent years, new progress has also been achieved in the field of disarmament. The United States and the Soviet Union have reached agreement in principle on the partial reduction of strategic nuclear weapons, and have agreed to

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stop producing and to start reducing their chemical weapons. Negotiations on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe are expected to make headway. In the multilateral domain, the international community has also made a number of major efforts and has achieved a number of encouraging results: negotiations by the Conference on Disarmament on a convention on the general prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons are continuing in depth; the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear-Test Ban has been re-established after a suspension of seven years; the rationalization of the work of the United Nations Disarmament Commission has achieved initial results and the Commission reached consensus on some questions which had remained unsolved for many years; and the numerous non-aligned and neutral States have made unswerving efforts and put forward many constructive suggestions and proposals in the First Committee and other multilateral agencies and meetings with a view to putting an end to the arms race and to promoting disarmament. The Chinese delegation welcomes these developments.

Meanwhile, we cannot but note that the world is still far from tranquil and the cause of world turbulence has yet to be removed. Given the ongoing arms race and arduous disarmament task, the international community needs to make more vigorous efforts. Even the super-Powers themselves have to admit that their nuclear and conventional arsenals, which are the largest in the world, are capable of destroying the world several times over. At the same time, multilateral disarmament, for well-known reasons, has not proceeded as expected, many just aspirations and reasonable demands of the international community have not received due attention and the important role of multilateral disarmament agencies has often been overlooked or played down. The process of disarmament is still being obstructed by the tendency to shift disarmament responsibilities and to alter disarmament targets.

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China has always pursued an independent foreign policy of peace and has made unswerving efforts to maintain world peace and promote the development of all countries. China has consistently opposed the arms race, stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear, space, chemical and biological weapons and for a drastic reduction of conventional weapons. China has adopted an active and constructive attitude on questions of arms control and disarmament and taken on its own initiative a series of practical actions in disarmament.

The Chinese Government has always attached great importance to questions of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war and has never evaded its responsibilities. China declared solemnly on the very first day that it came into possession of nuclear weapons that at no time and under no circumstances would China be the first to use nuclear weapons. China has undertaken not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-free zones. At the Fourth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), held not long ago, China once again reiterated this commitment.

It is the consistent view of the Chinese Government that, pending the realization of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, all nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances, and undertake unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-free zones. Therefore China is in favour of the conclusion of an international agreement on the non-first use of nuclear weapons and the elaboration of an international legal instrument against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons vis-à-vis the non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-free zones. This position was reiterated by Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen in his recent statement at the current session of the General

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Assembly. We hope that the aforementioned proposals made by China will receive a positive response from all the other nuclear-weapon States.

Undoubtedly, nuclear disarmament remains at the top of the disarmament agenda. The Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade, a document worked out by the Disarmament Commission this year, emphasizes that in the nuclear field we must continue urgently to seek early reductions in, and the eventual elimination of, nuclear weapons. The key to realizing this objective lies in the hands of the super-Powers which possess the largest nuclear arsenals. They must discharge in real earnest their special responsibilities by taking the lead to halt the testing, production and development of nuclear weapons and drastically reduce at an early date all types of nuclear weapons deployed at home or abroad. This will create conditions for convening a broadly representative international conference on nuclear disarmament with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States. Resolution 44/116 D on the question of nuclear disarmament, which was adopted, again by consensus, by the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session, embodies the common aspirations and demands of the international community in this regard. Such aspirations and demands will, we hope, be reaffirmed by the Assembly this year. In this connection China would welcome the accelerated negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union and the conclusion of a positive agreement. We also believe that world peace is indivisible, that the security of all countries and regions are of equal importance. Therefore, all bilateral and multilateral agreements on arms control and disarmament should contribute to the maintenance of the peace and security of the whole world and should not jeopardize the security interests of other countries and regions. The troops thus reduced should be demobilized and the armaments thus cut should be destroyed without being transferred to or redeployed in other regions. Such a step will be welcomed by the peoples of the world.

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The recently held Fourth NPT Review Conference was an important conference convened against the backdrop of dramatic changes on the international scene. It reflects the legitimate desire of the vast number of non-nuclear-weapon States for a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons and for a nuclear-free world. The Chinese Government sent a delegation to the Conference as an observer, a move that reflects our positive approach to the question of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear-weapon proliferation and indicates the importance China attaches to the Review Conference.

For the purpose of safeguarding world peace, security and stability, the Chinese Government follows a consistent policy not to advocate, encourage or engage in nuclear-weapon proliferation and not to help other countries develop nuclear weapons. On international co-operation in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, our Government has adopted an active, prudent and responsible approach. As a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), China faithfully abides by the statutes of the Agency. In its nuclear exports, China makes it a requirement that the importing State accept IAEA safeguards, and we have given assurances that China's nuclear imports are for peaceful purposes. China and the IAEA have signed an agreement according to which China voluntarily places some of its nuclear facilities under the Agency's safeguards. By so doing China has contributed its share to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Moreover, we are of the view that the prevention of nuclear proliferation itself is not the ultimate goal but a step in the process of effecting a complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. If one were to impose, under the excuse of preventing nuclear proliferation, all kinds of limits on the legitimate activities of non-nuclear countries in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy while evading his own responsibility for nuclear disarmament, such practice would

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naturally arouse the resentment of the non-nuclear contries at large and undermine the non-nuclear proliferation régime.

China understands the desire of the numerous non-nuclear-weapon States for a nuclear-test ban at an early date, and we stand for the objective of a total nuclear-test ban in the context of complete nuclear disarmament. China took an active part in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear-Test Ban, which was re-established by the Conference on Disarmament in 1990.

China has all along supported the establishment of nuclear-free zones and zones of peace by the countries concerned in various regions on the basis of their own accord through negotiations. We maintain that all nuclear-weapon States should respect the status of nuclear-free zones and undertake corresponding obligations as this represents an effective measure that contributes to the security and stability of all regions and promotes nuclear disarmament. Based on this principled stand, China signed and ratified the relevant protocols under the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty.

China has always been of the view that it is also imperative that the drastic reduction in conventional armaments be carried out along with vigorous efforts to promote nuclear disarmament. As is rightly pointed out in the Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade, we must strive for cuts in weapons and troops throughout the world, in particular in areas with the highest concentration of armaments such as Europe. For this, the big Powers possessing the largest and most sophisticated conventional arsenals bear a special responsibility. In this connection we welcome the positive momentum and progress in the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union and in the negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE) talks, and we hope that these negotiations will result in early agreements on a drastic reduction of conventional

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armaments, for this will not only serve the interests of stability and security in Europe but also help enhance the security of all countries, thus having a positive impact on conventional disarmament in other regions. In order to safeguard international peace, security and stability, all States should refrain from seeking armaments exceeding their defence requirements and no country must in any way be engaged in armed aggression or intervention against other countries. While keeping the necessary defence capabilities, it is important for all countries to promote conventional disarmament through practical action.

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The negotiations on a convention on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons are proceeding in depth. They have become a focal point in the work of the Conference on Disarmament, attracting widespread attention within the international community. Thanks to the active participation and concerted efforts of Member States and an increasing number of non-members, the negotiations have covered a lot of ground. However, some serious differences and difficulties still remain.

It is widely believed that whether and when a breakthrough can be made hinges to a great extent on whether the countries with colossal chemical arsenals command enough political will to discharge their special responsibility in practical terms. The United States and the Soviet Union have now committed themselves to halt the production of chemical weapons and gradually to reduce their chemical arsenals. That is a welcome step. At the same time, the international community demands their unconditional assurances on the non-use of chemical weapons and the unconditional, early and total destruction of all their existing chemical arsenals and production facilities. It should be emphatically pointed out that the complete prohibition and total destruction of chemical weapons is the fundamental objective of the convention and the only basis for negotiations. This is the key to the success of the negotiations.

As a non-chemical-weapon State and as a victim of chemical weapons in the past, China has always stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons and for an early realization of a world free from chemical weapons. We have actively participated in negotiations on the convention in the Conference on Disarmament and are keen to see an early conclusion of an authoritative, universal and effective international convention that can stand the test of time. With this in mind, we are in favour of the establishment under the

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convention of an effective, rational and viable verification régime, including challenge inspection, with a view to preventing both violations of the convention and abuses of verification. In this regard it is necessary to give full play to the leading role of the convention's organization. Attention should also be given and solutions found to such important issues as assistance, undiminished security and old chemical weapons.

Peace and development are the aspirations and goals shared by all people in the world, and the question of disarmament has a direct impact on world peace and on the security of all countries. That is why we have always held that all countries in the world - big or small, strong or weak - should have an equal right to participate in the deliberation, negotiation and resolution of disarmament issues. The question of disarmament should not be monopolized by a few big Powers without the participation of other States. The legitimate interests and just demands of all countries should be fully respected. While bilateral disarmament efforts are necessary in their own right, they cannot replace multilateral disarmament efforts of a regional or global nature. The important role of multilateral disarmament machinery should be brought into play to a greater degree. To that end the rationalization of the work of the Disarmament Commission has this year been crowned with initial results. In his report on the work of the Organization the Secretary-General commended the reform and stated:

> "The time is ripe to consider streamlining the work of other disarmament bodies as well. This is necessary for enabling the Organization to cope with issues requiring a concerted international effort." (A/45/1, p. 20)

We are in favour of any proposal that helps enhance the status and role of the multilateral disarmament machinery.

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The people of the world still face a long, uphill path in working for the maintenance of peace and for disarmament. Our world is one of new challenges and at the same time of promising opportunities. At this session of the General Assembly the Chinese delegation will take part in the work of the First Committee with a positive and pragmatic approach and a constructive attitude of co-operation. This year we will once again submit draft resolutions on nuclear and conventional disarmament issues respectively. Both issues are important objectives of the Third Disarmament Decade. We wish to enjoy the continued co-operation and support of all delegations. The Chinese delegation will also seriously study and actively support other draft resolutions, suggestions and ideas advanced by various parties that are conducive to peace, security and disarmament. We are ready to join other delegations in contributing to the success of the work of the First Committee at this session of the General Assembly and to progress in disarmament.

Mr. NAIMI-ARFA (Islamic Republic of Iran): I should like at the outset to express my delegation's great pleasure at seeing you, Mr. Chairman, presiding over the work of the First Committee. I am confident that under your leadership and with your diplomatic skills the Committee will achieve concrete results with respect to the mandate entrusted to it. May I also to join previous speakers in extending our warmest congratulations to the other officers of the Committee. I should also like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation to the senior advisers and to the Secretary of the First Committee.

The profound understanding of the concept of universal disarmament continues to take on new dimensions. In this context the broad international partnership that exists signifies that there is now a very favourable atmosphere for the taking of effective and all-inclusive measures. Control of the arms race should be a principal objective and be given top priority in international endeavours aimed

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at disarmament. We note with a sense of satisfaction that the remarkable developments in East-West relations, the tumultuous changes in Europe, particularly the historic event of the reunification of Germany, the progress in negotiations on conventional disarmament and the current promising negotiations within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe have all provided an auspicious opportunity for the realization of mankind's aspirations to eliminate the stockpile of nuclear armaments and other weapons of mass destruction as well.

Today, the fundamental changes in military doctrines and the forging of such new ideas as, inter alia, the doctrine of collective security are being raised and discussed in the international arena. In this connection one cannot over-stress the fact that other doctrines, such as the deterrence doctrine, have simply bolstered the logic of acquiring more advanced and sophisticated weapons. We firmly believe that the insistence of most of the major nuclear Powers on pursuing the step-by-step approach in the process of bilateral or multilateral arms control negotiations is neither consistent with the desires of peace-loving nations nor likely to prevent the qualitative improvement of nuclear and chemical weapons. That erroneous attitude, which has prevented international disarmament efforts from leading to the expected genuine and concrete results, may cause the aforementioned opportunity to slip away and, consequently, have grave and detrimental consequences that can endanger international peace and security.

Contrary to the prevailing climate of optimism that prevails in various forums and circles at the entry by the international community into a new era of co-operation and détente, conflicts and armed struggles, especially in the Middle East, where my country is located, are creating serious uncertainties in this

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connection. The Iraqi aggression against and occupation of Kuwait, leading to a vast military build-up and the presence of foreign forces, have escalated the already tense situation in the Persian Gulf area and will make the process of the proliferation, acquisition and modernization of weapons all the more probable.

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It is to be noted that poverty-stricken economies, conditions of insecurity, racism and disrespect for the rights of nations, together with hegemonic policies of the big Powers, are all factors that may cause new wars to break out. Perhaps in such an atmosphere to talk of disarmament without paying due attention to the deep roots of trends towards militarism will not contribute to finding an overall and comprehensive solution to this problem. Yet, in spite of this daunting outlook, we are not disappointed at international efforts for disarmament. In fact, although efforts in past decades have not been marked by remarkable success in terms of eliminating war and aggression, it is our sincere hope that by taking resolute decisions on disarmament and adopting effective measures to eliminate the most inhuman weapons, we shall be in a position to build a secure world free from aggression and war.

The scourge of nuclear weapons, whose use in the past led to the plight and suffering of thousands of human beings, remains a serious threat to the very existence of mankind. The most significant legal instrument adopted so far at the international level to control and check the nuclear-arms race is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Even though this Treaty, as a political decision and as a legal commitment, is valid for a large number of nations, and even though, thanks to it, the proliferation and development of nuclear arms have been somewhat controlled, its failure to deal with the issue of the qualitative growth of the nuclear-arms race is an alarming fact for our world today and its exclusion of those countries with a potential for producing nuclear arms raises serious doubts in certain countries as regards its viability.

The discriminatory implementation of the NPT has allowed certain countries, particularly the Zionist entity and South Africa, which are themselves elements of insecurity and instability in the Middle East and southern Africa, to embark on the

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development of nuclear weapons free from the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

It was against that background - only some of whose elements I have highlighted here - that the Fourth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons failed to reach a consensus on a final document of the Conference.

My country, all of whose activities have been placed under the IAEA safeguards system, firmly believes that it is only by placing the nuclear facilities of those countries capable of developing nuclear weapons under the IAEA verification system that the way will be paved for preserving the NPT, and diminishing and eventually eliminating the increased incentives for acquiring nuclear weapons.

I reiterate that such measures are specially important in crisis areas like the Middle East. It has been exactly in accordance with this policy that my country, which proposed to the General Assembly in 1974 the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, has during the course of many years been firmly determined and fully prepared to work to that end. In this context, we look forward to the consideration of the report of the Secretary-General contained in document A/45/435, concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. We are confident that the efforts of expert consultants appointed by the Secretary-General to identify effective and verifiable measures to facilitate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East - measures described contained in the aforementioned document - would constitute a sound basis for an in-depth and comprehensive consideration of the issue in the future.

Another significant issue within the framework of nuclear disarmament deals with security guarantees to be given to non-nuclear countries by nuclear-weapon States. Such guarantees should include the non-use of nuclear weapons against

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those countries. Even though this subject has been discussed at the Conference on Disarmament for many years, no concrete results have so far been registered.

Naturally, unilateral security guarantees envisaged by Security Council resolutions cannot be sufficient. It is obvious that such guarantees will make an important contribution to the elimination of the incentive for acquiring nuclear weapons. But for the Treaty to be permanently preserved and faithfully observed, it is essential to work for the elimination of its shortcomings.

The NPT's neglect of the issue of the qualitative growth and expansion of the nuclear-arms race constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security. It is for this reason that a nuclear test-ban has found its special place among disarmament issues. Unfortunately, despite many efforts, nuclear tests continue, unabated, and the international community has so far been unable to resolve this issue within the framework of a series of practical measures. We are pleased, of course, with the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and to define its mandate, but we believe that more immediate steps should be taken to overcome the time-consuming efforts involved in achieving a nuclear test-ban.

The partial test-ban Treaty was in itself an effective and useful measure. It imposed verification on nuclear tests, especially in outer space and underwater, and eventually averted the major dangers to mankind; but the fact that it did not include underground tests, which constitute the larger part of nuclear testing, means that mankind must still face this danger.

In this context, the collective endeavours of the parties to this Treaty to convene a conference to amend the Treaty and transform it into a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty is worthy of attention and appreciation. The Islamic Republic of Iran hopes that the conference, which is to convene in New York in January 1991 in accordance with the relevant resolution of the General Assembly,

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will be able to undertake all necessary measures for the adoption of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. The co-operation and collaboration of all nuclear Powers is essential if these international efforts are to have any concrete effect. But these efforts and their success should not be conditioned on the consent of all nuclear countries. The expansion of international co-operation and of co-ordinated measures that will lead to, among other things, an increased awakening and awareness of world public opinion will clear the way for more resolute and comprehensive measures. Therefore, one can have considerable hope that there will at least be a serious incentive for this amendment conference to ensure a deeper understanding of the threats and dangers of nuclear testing and to lay the necessary groundwork to prohibit it.

The danger that chemical weapons pose for international peace and security is well known. In light of the experience of the last 10 years, the Islamic Republic of Iran has actively and diligently pursued the ideal of chemical disarmament. The bitter experience of the use of chemical weapons in recent years has caused deep concern within the international community. This concern is reflected in the international conferences and forums convened to study this subject and requires even greater efforts than those initiated in the past in international organizations to ensure the elimination of the use of chemical weapons. Thus, the determination of States to eradicate this danger has given rise to a new phase. Negotiations on chemical-weapon disarmament are now continuing in the Conference on Disarmament, in whose deliberations the Islamic Republic of Iran participates actively. The Islamic Republic of Iran believes that the convention on chemical weapons should be well defined and marked by provisions for strong enforcement machinery, in order to preclude any possibility of political misuse. The best means for making the convention universal are guarantees that it will lay the necessary groundwork for the elimination of chemical weapons, thus ensuring the

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security of countries that do not possess such weapons, and that the major Powers will not insist on maintaining certain quantities of their chemical weapons as a security stock, in contradiction with the concept of the total elimination of chemical weapons.

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The convention should have built-in provisions to block self-serving, political manoeuvres. It should be possible to enforce verification systems in the absence of political manipulation, especially if the convention has been violated. Punishments and assistance programmes should be automatic; furthermore, applying punishment or assistance measures should not only be deterrents to the use of chemical weapons, they should also prevent any party violating the convention from achieving its goals.

Another point that merits close attention is that the provisions of a convention should not impede technological advancement on the part of Member States in the chemical field. Indeed, as a quid pro quo for committing themselves to abiding by the convention, Member States should be granted aid in the field of industrial chemistry.

It is our sincere hope that a chemical weapons convention, if it is strong enough and provides sufficient guarantees, will create a solid enough political will on the part of the countries of the world to lead to the total elimination of this category of weapons of mass destruction. We should not need to point out that, pending the conclusion of such a convention, all States must abide by their international commitments under the 1925 Geneva Protocol: the international community should adopt immediate and effective measures to prevent any violations.

There has been no progress of note in naval disarmament. Rather, we are witnessing a constant expansion of the arms race at sea. Nuclear warships and submarines are potential sources of major dangers: in this respect, the security of coastal States demands special attention.

The Persian Gulf, as one of the most strategic international waterways, is important for many countries, and the security of coastal States and the prevention of military confrontation in this vitally important region deserve full

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attention. The Islamic Republic of Iran, with the longest coastline on the Persian Gulf, calls for international forums to give the issue of naval disarmament extensive consideration; this should include more careful attention by the Disarmament Commission. Naturally, when waterways adjacent to the territorial waters of coastal States are freely used by foreign warships, those States feel justifiably insecure.

The Islamic Republic of Iran, a country fully aware of its vital and sensitive role in the Middle East, has made public its support for disarmament and stands ready to work more energetically towards this end. I hope that with greater efforts on the part of the international community and given the necessary groundwork for advancing the cause of disarmament, mankind will be able to witness a world free of anxieties concerning the threat or use of offensive destructive weapons, and a world in which peace and amity will prevail in the relations between States.

Mr. NYAKYI (United Republic of Tanzania): Let me, at the outset, say how pleased I am to see you preside over the work of our Committee. Your election is a recognition of your outstanding diplomatic skills and your wide-ranging experience in the affairs of the United Nations. On behalf of my delegation, I extend to you our warmest congratulations. My felicitations go also to the other officers of the Committee.

Since our last session, the international community has witnessed dramatic and significant changes in the world political arena - significant, not because we have as a result of them come any closer to a peaceful world, but because these changes bring new challenges and opportunities. With the dawning of the 1990s has come the end of the cold war and the inception of a new era of co-operation and understanding between nations which in the past were ideologically opposed.

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Ideological confrontation between East and West is now a thing of the past. The dismantling of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent reunification of Germany are major landmarks in the improving relations between East and West.

In the field of disarmament, the thawing of relations between the two super-Powers over the past year has inspired heightened expectations for a breakthrough in the efforts to reverse the arms race. The momentum generated by the signing of the INF Treaty has slowed down, but it can still be felt: super-Power summits have now become regular phenomena. The signing - at the Washington summit in June this year - of the bilateral agreement on the destruction of the super-Powers' chemical weapons attests to the new spirit of the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union as they assume their responsibility to rid the world of their deadly weapons.

Nevertheless, it is regrettable that the summit left several matters hanging in the balance, pre-eminent among which is the urgent need to agree on a reduction in strategic forces. Even though negotiations were pointing to a 30 per cent reduction, in the end agreement eluded the two leaders.

The agreements so far concluded by the two super-Powers constitute only partial measures, which have served only to consolidate their monopoly of lethal weapons. Their agreements, above all, ensure that their military might is not compromised in any way, and so, welcome as they are, they do not make our world any safer to live in. The dread of the horrible consequences of a global war with the current level of world armaments has not been diminished by the rapprochement between the super-Powers. If the current crisis in the Gulf has demonstrated anything, it is that the risk of unleashing another world war is no longer a hypothetical one. The Secretary-General, in his report on the work of the

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Organization, submitted to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session, rightly surmises that

> "... to claim that we have navigated the rough waters and are now sheltered from the unexpected would be naive and dangerous ... many challenges have to be squarely addressed before the present positive trend can be deemed irreversible and indeed world wide". (A/45/1, p. 18)

For the security of nations to endure, due regard should be given to the emerging political trends that have rendered certain defence doctrines irrelevant. I cannot do better than to quote from the statement by the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze, at this current session of the General Assembly, in which he said:

> "Even in the past the doctrines of the "balance of terror" and "nuclear deterrence" were questionable means of maintaining the security of the world. In the new conditions of today they have simply become irrelevant."
> (A/45/PV.6, p. 48)

It is therefore a fallacy and an illusion that peace can be achieved through a strategic balance of deadly weapons, particularly nuclear weapons.

We are encouraged by the progress made in Vienna on the negotiations within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe. We believe that the treaty will, when signed, go a long way towards drastically reducing conventional forces in Europe, the region with the highest concentration of armaments.

(Mr. Nyakyi, United Republic of Tanzania)

It is paradoxical that, despite their professed commitment to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the major nuclear Powers have significantly halted neither the vertical nor the horizontal proliferation of these weapons. While some of the nuclear Powers have sheltered their ambitions under the umbrella of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the proliferation of nuclear weapons has continued, with the qualitative and quantitative improvement of their arsenals. Their reluctance to enter into serious negotiations for a comprehensive test ban, among other things, must cast doubt on their commitment to observe the non-proliferation régime. Reports that the Fourth Review Conference foundered on the question of a comprehensive test ban are a matter of serious regret to my delegation.

An agreement to halt nuclear testing is the surest way to check the escalation of the arms race, to sustain non-proliferation and to avert the risk of a nuclear war. International security cannot be guaranteed by merely reducing the number of those who control those arms. It is unrealistic to ask others to rely for their security on the good faith and whims of the big Powers - which is what the major nuclear-weapon States seem to suggest. If the Non-Proliferation Treaty is to endure, the nuclear-weapon States, particularly those that are parties to the NPT, must abide by their Treaty obligations to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race.

Tanzania's support for, and its participation in, all initiatives that seek to achieve a total ban on all nuclear tests have been motivated by its strong conviction that the nuclear-arms race cannot be halted or reversed without a comprehensive test ban. For the same reason, we look forward to participating actively in the forthcoming Partial Test Ban Treaty Amendment Conference, to which Tanzania has pledged its full support.

(Mr. Nyakyi, United Republic of Tanzania)

The acquisition of nuclear weapons by any State is bad enough because it adds to the threat of a nuclear war; the acquisition of a nuclear-weapons capability by the South African racist régime is a frightening nightmare. While it has not been disputed by any party that South Africa has the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons, efforts to deter this régime from expanding its nuclear-weapons programme have, unfortunately, been thwarted by those collaborating with the régime. Instead of applying pressure on countries that present no nuclear threat - countries that have no nuclear capability and no ambitions to accede to the NPT - the major nuclear-weapon Powers should be confronting South Africa, which is the real threat to peace and security in the region. I cannot resist the temptation to quote one scholar, who recently described the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the following terms:

> "It works best where it is needed least, and it does not work at all where it is needed most."

We welcome the positive outcome of the discussion, by the Disarmament Commission at its 1990 session, on the question of South Africa's nuclear capability. It may be recalled that a solution had eluded the Commission for over a decade. It is our hope that the recommendations of the Disarmament Commission will positively influence our present debate.

We also look forward to the Secretary-General's report on South Africa's nuclear-ballistic-missile capability - a report that the General Assembly requested in resolution 44/113 B.

As in the past, the report of the Conference on Disarmament is a disappointment to many of us. The report raises some hope of progress with regard to the consideration of some of the priority items on the agenda of the Conference. One such item is that relating to a nuclear-test ban. At long last,

(Mr. Nyakyi, United Republic of Tanzania)

there was consensus on establishing an Ad Hoc Committee to deal with the issue. However, this positive development in the work of the Conference on Disarmament diminishes as one continues to read the report. For example, the Committee was given no negotiating mandate. Moreover, at the conclusion of the session, agreement could not be reached for renewal of the Committee at next year's session of the Conference.

My delegation is equally disappointed and dismayed at the failure to conclude a multilateral convention to ban chemical weapons, despite the hopes raised at its last session for a major breakthrough. It is a matter of regret that negotiations have been hamstrung with technical excuses.

It was expected that the signing of the bilateral agreement on chemical weapons by the United States and the Soviet Union would facilitate the conclusion of the negotiations in Geneva. Unfortunately, these expectations have not been realized. While we welcome - indeed, encourage - the bilateral negotiationss, we must stress that they should not be allowed to replace or supplant the multilateral negotiations. The central role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament cannot be overemphasized. In this connection I wish to pay tribute to the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs and his staff for continuing to uphold and to strengthen this role.

Another issue that deserves our attention is the extension of the arms race into outer space. Here again the Conference on Disarmament - the only multilateral-disarmament negotiating body - has had its work stalled by those who have, in effect, put their narrow self-interest above the interests of humankind. Outer space, recognized in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty as the common heritage of mankind, is now in danger of becoming a new arena for the arms race. Outer space belongs to us all and should therefore be used for the benefit of humanity as a whole.

(Mr. Nyakyi, United Republic of Tanzania)

I wish now to touch on another very thorny issue of particular interest to the people of the Indian Ocean region. For nearly two decades the Indian Ocean States have sought to implement the 1971 Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. Our efforts to convene an international conference in Colombo, which would pave the way for the implementation of that Declaration, have unfortunately been persistently frustrated by the major Western maritime Powers. Out of their selfish security interests and those of their allies, these Powers have continually undermined the work of the Ad Hoc Committee entrusted with the preparation of the Conference.

The easing of East-West tension should have facilitated implementation of the Declaration. In this connection, the withdrawal by the major Western maritime Powers from the Ad Hoc Committee is totally at variance with the mood of the times. This has further undermined the work of the Committee. In the wake of the Iraq-Kuwait crisis and the consequent military build-up in the Gulf, which is an integral part of the Indian Ocean, the hopes for the establishment of a zone of peace have been further shattered. The vulnerability of the littoral and hinterland States is self-evident.

There has been one positive development relating to the Declaration. We welcome the adoption and signing of the Agreement on the Establishment of the Organization of the Indian Ocean Marine Affairs Co-operation (IOMAC), at Arusha, Tanzania, in September this year during the IOMAC II Conference. Among other things, the Agreement opens up new avenues for peaceful co-operation between States in the region. This, in essence, represents a major confidence-building measure in the region, which for years has been dominated by tension emanating from super-Power military rivalry. We hope that all Indian Ocean States will sign the Agreement as a matter of priority.

(Mr. Nyakyi, United Republic of Tanzania)

As they have evolved, disarmament agreements have increasingly been made conditional upon agreement on reliable verification measures. The emerging attitude has been that there can be little hope of maintaining confidence in compliance without reliable verification - even though foolproof verification is unattainable. For the super-Powers the guiding principle in their negotiations has been "trust but verify". While we do not dispute that notion we believe that in the past the major hurdle has been a lack of political will. As the Agreement on intermediate- and shorter-range nuclear forces (INF) demonstrated, where political will exists agreement on verification can easily be reached.

We welcome and commend the efforts of the Group of Experts on verification, whose comprehensive report on the role of the United Nations in verification is before the Committee. My delegation will make its views known on the substance of that report at a later stage in our deliberations.

Even if all weaponry were to disappear from the face of the Earth, the lives of millions of people in many parts of the world would still be threatened by endemic disease, hunger and malnutrition. One of the major dividends of disarmament would therefore be the opportunity to use the resources released through disarmament measures to alleviate poverty and thus to ensure sustainable development.

We all have a stake in the survival of the human race. By working for peace, disarmament and universal security we shall be working for a safer future for ourselves and for future generations. The world community has responded with unprecedented unity to the crisis in the Gulf. We hope the newly found unity of

(Mr. Nyakyi, United Republic of Tanzania)

the international community, especially among the permanent members of the Security Council, will be deployed to confront the many unresolved crises still facing the world today. The United Nations was born of war. The elimination of armaments was and must continue to be one of the primary tasks on its agenda.

The meeting rose at 12.05 p.m.